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Abstract 
 
 
 
This paper examines how information transfer about contamination levels found at 
brownfield sites capitalizes into nearby property values. More specifically, a hedonic 
model is used to test the impact on housing transaction prices when a binary measure (i.e. 
exceeding a threshold or not) or a continuous measure (i.e. chemical levels) is used. In 
the analysis, I exploit the variation in the contaminant thresholds, caused by regulatory 
conditions defined by the state of Massachusetts, holding the contaminant level constant. 
As thresholds are tied to neighborhood attributes in areas surrounding brownfields, 
threshold exceedance is potentially correlated to unobserved factors that impact housing 
values. An instrumental variables approach is used to create variation in threshold 
exceedance through the use of an instrument that measures the presence to underground 
aquifers. After instrumenting for threshold exceedance, my estimates indicate that a 
10.8% decrease in housing values occurs when a contaminant threshold is exceeded, 
while the continuous measures of toxicity indicate a negative but insignificant effect. 
These findings suggest that policy makers should consider information conveyance when 
creating policies to inform homeowners of pollution presence, as improved information 
provision may increase public awareness about local environmental concerns. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Environmental policy often aims to combat externalities and alleviate threats to 
the biophysical environmental, including to human welfare. To achieve the successful 
integration and benefits of such policies, especially related to pollution and toxic waste, 
public information transfer on environmental quality is of the utmost importance. Firstly, 
access to improved information allows households to make more informed decisions and 
adjust their behavior to reduce pollution exposure (Viscusi et al 1986, Smith and Johnson 
1988, Graff Zivin et al 2011, Graff Zivin and Neidell 2009). Secondly, information 
provisions can incentivize firms to reduce output waste as a response to household 
demand for improved environmental quality (Hamilton 1995, Konar and Cohen 1997, 
Khanna and Damon 1999, Powers 2013). Thus, policy related to pollutant information 
release concerning potential threats to community residents should be thoughtfully 
considered and legislated. 
Due to the importance of information transfer, research examining the 
relationship between pollutant contamination and housing transaction price has become 
prevalent in the past decade. Considerable research has been undertaken on household 
demand for environmental quality including the analysis of changing risk perceptions as a 
reaction to changing information (McClelland et al 1990, Gayer and Viscusi 2002, Bui 
and Mayer 2003, Decker et al 2005, Oberholzer-Gee and Mitsunari 2006, Sanders 2013) 
to test whether neighborhood pollution levels are capitalized into housing markets. 
The majority of papers on this topic show that contaminant information 
negatively affects housing prices when risk perceptions increase after the information 
release. While these findings are generally consistent, the methods for information 
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release vary. These methods include public administrative data on toxins released (Bui 
and Mayer 2003, Decker et al 2005, Oberholzer-Gee and Mitsunari 2006, Sanders 2013), 
newspaper coverage (Gayer and Viscusi 2002), direct solicitation from households 
(Gawande and Jenkins-Smith 2001), and environmental site or risk assessments 
(McClelland et al 1990, Ma 2014). The possibility that households assess types and 
methods of information transfer differently has also been analyzed by looking at 
information release from the Toxic Inventory Release (TIR) program (Bui and Mayer 
2003). They find that increasing information provision had no impact on housing prices, 
which was attributed to the fact that individuals could not comprehend the complexity of 
the information given. Thus, from a policy perspective, it appears that information 
transfer regarding contamination should be simple and direct so that the public can make 
informed decisions based on their perceived safety. 
This paper aims to contribute to the literature regarding environmental 
information provision through the examination of the effectiveness of a binary measure 
(i.e. a threshold) in information transfer. More specifically, I collect data from the State 
of Massachusetts (MA) on individual chemicals found at brownfield sites, which are 
defined by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as industrial and 
commercial areas that contain one or more hazardous substances, pollutants or 
contaminants. I then compare this to the threshold value determined by MA regulatory 
provisions in order to assess the toxicity for each chemical, and subsequently for the 
entire site. By doing this I can exploit the variation in contaminant threshold values, 
which are based on regulatory requirements for brownfield sites in MA. As the variation 
in threshold levels is tied to neighborhood characteristics such as proximity to schools 
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and hospitals, threshold exceedance may be correlated with unobserved neighborhood 
characteristics that also impact housing values. To overcome this, I use brownfield 
proximity to an underground aquifer as an instrument to ensure exogenous variation in 
threshold exceedance.  
 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 EPA Brownfield Program 
 
Over the past few decades, federal, state and local governments have put 
increased resources into combating pollution and rehabilitating neighborhoods where 
pollutants are found. Specifically, areas that contain polluted brownfield sites are often 
abandoned or underutilized, despite the fact that they pose a relatively low risk to nearby 
residents. These sites are seen as unattractive places to live and work, making them prime 
targets for remediation. Remediation efforts can be of great benefit to economically 
depressed areas, as a non-performing piece of real estate is converted into a productive 
entity.  
Survey research on brownfield sites labeled Temporarily Obsolete Abandoned 
Derelict Sites (TOADS) found that people have a negative perception of local 
environments where brownfields exist, leading to a decline in business and residential 
interest. In these areas, illegal activities such as waste dumping and drug abuse are also 
more likely to occur, further stigmatizing the neighborhood (Greenburg et al. 2000). 
Market-based incentives were also analyzed to determine benefits of brownfield cleanup. 
While contaminated sites were deemed less attractive by a survey of real estate 
developers, regulatory relief was found to influence land utilization (Alberini et al. 2005). 
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These studies confirm investor worries regarding hidden costs and highlight the 
importance of remediation action on brownfield sites. 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency Brownfields Program aims 
to identify and clean up brownfields in the hopes of improving neighborhood aesthetics 
and value. This program was instituted in 1995, at which time the EPA began providing 
grant funding to organizations looking to revitalize brownfields for environmental, social 
and economic benefits. In 2002, the Small Business Liability and Brownfields 
Revitalization Act, or “Brownfields Law”, was signed, increasing financial funding for 
brownfield remediation. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates 
that there are over 450,000 brownfield sites in the United States, with others that have not 
yet been recognized.  
The grants given by the Brownfields Program vary in size and type, depending on 
the condition of the site and the community’s level of need. In total, there are four types 
of grants designated: assessment grants, job training grants, cleanup grants and revolving 
loan fund grants. Each grant serves a different purpose for the community; however all 
represent important aspects of remediation efforts. These grants typically provide up to 
$200,000 for their specified purpose. Assessment grants are the most common type of 
grant awarded, providing funds to be used for planning a brownfield cleanup. On the 
other hand, funds allocated to job training grants are the least common, and are used to 
find and train unemployed and low-income residents from local areas to assist with the 
site cleanup. Cleanup grants remediate brownfields that have been exposed to petroleum 
or hazardous pollutant contamination. Finally, revolving loan fund grants help to 
capitalize a revolving loan fund, providing loans and sub-grants for clean up processes.  
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Overall, from 2002- 2011, the U.S EPA paid over $670 million for brownfield 
grants, $331.3 million for 1,479 assessment grants, $25.2 million for 121 job training 
grants, $150.7 million for 801 cleanup grants, and $167.5 million for 143 revolving loan 
grants. However, even though this money designated for cleanups is a good starting 
point, data compiled from the Council for Urban Economic Development (CUED) and 
the EPA show that in 1999 brownfield cleanups were estimated to cost an average 
$780,000 per site (Paull 2008). This amount is significantly higher than the typical 
$200,000 grants provided by the EPA, especially when inflation and conversion to 2014 
dollars brings the amount closer to an estimated $1.1 million dollars. 
Despite the associated financial costs, brownfield cleanups have been found to be 
beneficial to communities and residents for multiple reasons. Not only does cleanup 
improve environmental factors including adverse effects caused by the pollutant, but it 
also helps to promote economic growth in urban areas. Overall, brownfield remediation 
can help economic development, protect public health, revitalize neighborhoods, create 
jobs and grow the tax base (Pepper 1997). Nonetheless, investors often fear the liabilities 
associated with developing a contaminated site and the high costs associated with 
remediation. This is especially relevant as it can be difficult to determine the specific set 
of pollutants found at the site, leading to additional costs for investigation and repeated 
remediation. Other obstacles to brownfield cleanup include lack of capital, community 
concerns, liability issues and environmental policy regulations. 
In recent years, states have realized the value of cleanup efforts, even if complete 
elimination of pollutants has not been achieved. Thus, many states have adopted a “risk-
based approach,” emphasizing risk assessment and management. This means that they 
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accept the presence of certain contaminants, as long as human exposure and 
environmental risk is eliminated. Because of this, over time the number of voluntary state 
brownfield cleanup programs has grown exponentially (Rakestraw 2000).  
 
Figure 1: Growth of Voluntary State Brownfield Cleanup Programs Over Time 
 
2.2 Contamination Reporting in Massachusetts 
In 1986, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) 
was enacted, establishing reporting requirements to provide the public with better 
information regarding hazardous chemicals present within local communities (U.S. EPA 
2014). It is important to note that the EPCRA does not place limits on what chemicals 
can be used at any facility, instead transforming the documentation and notification 
process associated with contaminant information release. This policy is effective in all 
states, for all sites where hazardous chemicals are present, including brownfield sites.  
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In Massachusetts, brownfield sites are assessed and contamination levels are 
measured by the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MA-DEP).  
This is a formal process that analyzes sites based on a handbook known as the 
Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP). Each assessment is undertaken by a licensed 
environmental professional, who collects and analyzes samples of soil, groundwater, air 
and sediment. The tested contaminant levels are then compared to a threshold that is 
specific to each individual chemical based on toxicity, human threat and neighborhood 
characteristics.   
More specifically, stricter threshold standards for a given site will hold if there is 
a residential population within one mile, institutions such as schools, hospitals and 
community centers within 500 feet, on-site workers, if the site is on an aquifer, or if 
within 500 feet of a drinking water source. Thus, a threshold level will be lower if there 
are higher risks of human exposure (e.g. school) or a greater potential to cause 
environmental harm (e.g. wetland). Specifically in Massachusetts, these standards are 
defined as GW-1 through GW-3 for groundwater, with GW-1 being the highest threshold, 
and S-1 through S-3 for soil, with S-1 being the highest threshold. 
 
2.3 Hedonic Analysis 
Hedonic pricing models have been used to analyze the impact of diverse 
environmental factors on housing values. Hedonic analysis has its roots in the theory of 
value developed by Lancaster in 1966, which explains commodity value as a collection of 
characteristics.  Ridker and Henning first applied this method to environmental research 
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in 1967, looking at the effect of air pollution on property values in St Louis. The pair 
found a negative relationship between housing price and sulfate air measures.  
 In 1974, Rosen explored the use of hedonic prices to estimate the value of specific 
amenities, such as environmental quality. His work was essential as it set up a theoretical 
framework for recovering the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) from a hedonic price 
regression by specifying the relationships between consumer preferences for specific 
characteristics and the price function, also known as hedonic equilibrium.  
Hedonic models have been used in many different contexts to value household 
preferences for environmental and non-environmental factors. A hedonic framework was 
employed when estimating the value residents place on living away from Superfund 
hazardous waste sites in order to minimize cancer risks (Gayer, Hamilton and Viscusi 
2000). Residents are willing to pay the most to avoid risk before the remedial 
investigation documentation is released, informing residents of composite risk. The 
amount that they are willing to pay to leave the polluted neighborhood declines after they 
are aware of the size of the risk, presumably because the information released lowers 
perceived levels of hazard. 
The valuation of brownfield sites, which is the application of a hedonic 
framework used in my paper, has been used to look at the change in property values after 
brownfield remediation has occurred (Haninger et al. 2013). Large increases in property 
price are realized following a brownfield cleanup, ranging from 4.0% to 24.8%. Another 
hedonic analysis looked at Kenosha, Wisconsin and analyzed the response of property 
values to local brownfields (Kaufman and Cloutier 2006). It was estimated that a 
brownfield cleanup would increase property values for 890 homes between $2.4 and 
	   12	  
$7.01 million. The focus of these analyses was on the benefits of a brownfield cleanup on 
the neighborhood housing markets. In my analysis, I only examine sites that have not yet 
experienced a cleanup, but fulfill the eligibility requirements and have submitted a 
cleanup grant application to the state of Massachusetts.  
The effect of a nearby brownfield site on home prices in Atlanta and Cleveland 
was also analyzed using a hedonic model (Leigh and Coffin 2005). The presence of a 
brownfield is found to lower property values, with the highest impact falling on those 
who live within 500 feet of a brownfield. This model differs from what I will undertake, 
as in this analysis site pollutants and thresholds were not taken into consideration, 
meaning that all brownfield sites were considered to have an equal impact on housing 
transaction price. 
 
3 Model Specifications 
3.1 Hedonic Regression  
In my paper, a hedonic model was utilized to analyze property valuation and 
information transfer to residents living near brownfield sites. A hedonic model can be 
used where product variety within the same market gives rise to price differences that can 
be analyzed in market transactions. By observing the choices consumers make with 
regards to differing characteristics and prices of goods, the implicit price of one 
component can be estimated. However, as brownfield remediation is not an item traded in 
markets, I must infer its value based upon housing transactions in the surrounding 
neighborhood.  
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In a hedonic regression, few guidelines exist for determining the influence of 
individual characteristics, however each variable must be noted for its effect on price. In 
its simplest form, the hedonic price function is a linear regression. However, marginal 
prices are unlikely to remain constant for all characteristics. Thus, several functions exist 
for evaluation based on specific attributes 
Table 1: Table of Possible Hedonic Functions 
Name Equation Implicit Price 
Linear 𝑃 =∝!+ 𝛽! 𝑧! 𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑧! = 𝛽! 
Semi Log ln  (𝑃) =∝!+ 𝛽! 𝑧! 𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑧! = 𝛽!𝑃 
Double Log ln  (𝑃) =∝!+ 𝛽! 𝑙𝑛(𝑧!) 𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑧! = 𝛽! 𝑃 𝑧! 
Quadratic 𝑃 = 𝛼 +    𝛽!!!!! 𝑧! +   12 𝛿!"!!!!!!!! 𝑧!𝑧! 𝜕𝑃𝜕𝑧! = 𝛽! +   12 𝛿!"!!! 𝑧! +   𝛿!"𝑧! 
 
The hedonic method is most commonly applied to housing market analysis, in 
which house structure, land amenities, neighborhood attributes and geographic location 
must be taken into consideration.  In my analysis, factors that may influence housing 
price include house, site, neighborhood and environmental quality characteristics, such as 
the number of bedrooms, square footage of the house, neighborhood crime rates, and 
percentage of low-income families in the neighborhood.  
For my analysis, the hedonic function is in a semi log form. I model the price of a 
property, P, that is located in district, j, near brownfield site, m, as the following ln𝑃!"#$ =∝!+ β!𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑜𝑥!" +   𝛽! 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑!"# +   𝜀!"#$ 
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where 𝜀!"#$ is an idiosyncratic shock that is specific to the property at time t. To examine 
whether consumers care about the actual toxic threat of a brownfield site, or simply 
whether a threshold has been exceeded, 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑜𝑥!" , which refers to the maximum 
toxicity found at the brownfield at time t, and 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑!"#  are used. 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑!"#  is set equal to one if a particular house in district j, within 3km of 
a site m, has any contaminant exceeding a threshold at the time when a report was 
compiled. This variable allows for adequate examination of the impact of any chemical 
exceeding the assigned threshold value. 
The hedonic price function yields estimates of implicit prices of attributes that can 
be used to uncover consumer preferences. Consumers want to maximize their utility 𝑈  (𝑍, 𝑥;   𝛼), where 𝑍  is a vector of characteristics of a property, x is all other goods, 𝛼 are 
the household characteristics and y is income 
                            L = max𝑢  (𝑍, 𝑥;   𝛼)+   𝜆  (𝑦 − 𝑥 − 𝑃 𝑍 ) 
The first order conditions derived from this problem imply that 
!"!!!!"!" = 𝑃!(𝑍) . This 
represents the tangency point of the individual’s indifference curve map and budget 
constraint, where the indifference curve is:   𝑢 Z, 𝑥;   𝛼 = 𝑢!. This is combined with the 
budget constraint, implied by the hedonic price function. 
The hedonic price function shows how the price of a house varies with given 
attributes, with the slope giving the implicit price of the attributes as well as the marginal 
willingness to pay for the consumer who purchases that level of attributes. However, it is 
important to note that the individual demand curve for the attribute cannot be estimated 
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without more data and theory, as the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) is known at 
only one point.  
My analysis implements the hedonic method, and is based upon the idea that a 
homeowner’s disutility from living near a brownfield site can be measured by comparing 
differences in housing values. The homeowner’s marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) to 
live further from a brownfield site can be read off of the hedonic gradient, or the 
derivative of the hedonic price function. 
One issue with the hedonic approach is that all health hazards from living near a 
brownfield site may not be apparent, and thus will not be reflected in housing transaction 
data. However, due to the low risk nature of brownfield sites, especially when compared 
to other environmental pollutant sites (Superfund sites, TSDFs etc.) the risk of unknown 
health hazards is probably slim. 
As I cannot guarantee that my estimates are not being confounded by unobserved 
factors, both year and district fixed effects are used in my analysis. Fixed effects 
essentially take the neighborhood means of each attribute being analyzed, and create 
mean-differenced data in order to control for permanent unobservable differences 
between neighborhoods surrounding brownfields. Assuming that the idiosyncratic error 
term is decomposed into district-specific fixed factors, 𝜇!, and brownfield- specific, time-
varying factors, 𝑣!": 𝜀 = 𝜇! +   𝑣!" + 𝜀 
Then fixed effects removes the unobserved district-level factors, 𝜇!, that may confound 
estimates. 
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3.2 Instrumental Variables 
Endogeneity issues arise with the variable describing threshold exceedance, as 
this variable may be correlated with unobserved neighborhood characteristics that also 
impact housing transaction price. Thus, an instrumental variable (IV) approach is used to 
alleviate the correlation of the variable exceedthreshold with the error term, 𝜀. Using IV 
allows for the isolation of the variation in exceedthreshold that is uncorrelated with 𝜀, 
thus disregarding the piece that causes bias in the OLS and FE estimates. To achieve this, 
I use an instrument, aquifer, that is correlated with price only through exceedthreshold, 
and is uncorrelated with 𝜀, defined as: 𝑎𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟 =        1              if  brownfield  to  aquifer  distance = 0  0                otherwise                                                                                                    
Because the presence of an aquifer is used to determine the threshold value for 
each contaminant, it is directly correlated with the exceedthreshold term. Specifically, if a 
brownfield is situated above an aquifer, threshold values will be lower, and it is more 
likely that a threshold will be exceeded. Thus, the instrument easily satisfies the 
relevance condition, that: 𝐶𝑜𝑣   𝑎𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟, 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 ≠ 0 
Proving the instrument’s exogeneity, or 𝐶𝑜𝑣   𝑎𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟, 𝜀 = 0 is challenging due 
to the difficulty of demonstrating that aquifer location is not correlated with unobservable 
factors. However, as aquifers are located underground, this suggests that individuals may 
not even be aware of their property’s proximity to one. Thus, aquifer is a stronger 
instrument than, for example, distance from schools, as it should not be correlated with 
neighborhood factors that affect housing prices, as a school would be.  
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Also, while exogeneity cannot be formally tested, balance tests provide further 
evidence for the validity of aquifer as an instrument (Gayer and Viscusi 2002).  By 
collecting data on housing attributes, differences between treated groups (brownfield sites 
exceeding thresholds) and control groups (brownfield sites that do not exceed thresholds) 
can be analyzed. The differences in means of observable housing attributes, combined 
with observable neighborhood attributes, are tested to verify that the data are not 
statistically different across the instrument. If I fail to reject the balance t-test, this means 
that the difference in the means of observed attributes between houses located on an 
aquifer and houses not located on an aquifer is statistically undistinguishable from zero. 
Thus, the attributes are “balanced”, meaning that the treatment and control groups can be 
considered the same. This analysis provides further verification of the exogeneity of the 
instrument.* 
The IV approach is carried out using the two stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. 
This method decomposes exceedthreshold into two components, and uses the component 
not correlated with 𝜀 to estimate the exceedthreshold coefficient. The first stage assumes 
that there is a regression that links exceedthreshold and the instrument, aquifer: 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑!"# =  ∝!+ β!𝑎𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟! + β!𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑜𝑥!" +   𝜀! 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* One concern with the aquifer instrument is that it may be negatively correlated with areas that 
are serviced by piped water (PWSA). These PWSA’s in turn are most likely correlated with house price, as 
houses that have a piped water system will probably be considered more valuable by homeowners. To test 
this, I obtained known locations of the PWSA’s from the Office of Geographic Information, which were 
recorded when MA began a project that interviewed public water suppliers around the state. However, due 
to funding issues this project was halted after data was compiled for 131 cities and towns in the eastern 
region of the state. Therefore, this presents an issue with inferring data about other regions and is not used 
in my analysis. In order to obtain definitive results and complete data, collaboration with the state 
department is needed and will take additional time to recover data maps.  
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Next, in the second stage, the uncorrelated component of exceedthreshold is used 
to estimate price by replacing 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑!   with ∝!+ β!𝑎𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟!, where ∝! and β! recovered using the OLS estimates from the regression above. 
 
4 Data 
4.1 EPA Data 
In order to complete my analysis, housing transaction data from Dataquick 
Information Services is examined and combined with pollutant data available from the 
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  
The pollutant threshold and site contaminant levels were personally collected 
from reports released by the U.S EPA. Each of the 66 MA brownfield sites in my analysis 
are associated with between 1 and 9 reports, depending on how many times pollutant 
contamination levels have been measured. These reports vary from 100 to 700 pages in 
length, consisting of written analyses describing site history and findings, tables of 
chemical breakdown, and maps outlining geographic and land conditions. The EPA lists 
not only the concentration of pollutants at these sites, but also determines whether certain 
pollutants cross thresholds and constitute risks. For the sites with multiple brownfield 
assessments over numerous years, differing contaminant values over time are recorded as 
individual data points.  
Specifically, this EPA data set includes variables for the date that the assessment 
was completed and breaks down contaminants by where on the site they are found- soil, 
sediment, surface water, ground water, air or other. Most sites collected pollutant 
concentrations for soil and groundwater, while air and sediment data were sporadically 
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collected when there was a perceived threat. The majority of sites reported soil and 
groundwater from 4-10 locations on the site to examine differences in pollutant 
concentrations. In my analysis, the chemical concentrations from these different site 
samples are compared, and the highest concentration is recorded and assessed against the 
threshold value. The maximum concentration value is used as it is the most concerning to 
residents. In order to account for thresholds exceeded by contaminants, a variable labeled 
“toxicity” is calculated as the maximum concentration value divided by the threshold 
level, giving the relative danger of that contaminant. Any toxicity over 100% therefore 
indicates exceedance of the threshold for that given contaminant.  
Thresholds are used in my analysis as they indicate whether there is a price 
differential between homes with the same pollutant concentrations and differing pollution 
threshold labels. In general, thresholds may be more important than pollutant 
concentrations as the public is notified of exceeded thresholds levels by mail or public 
newspaper announcement. Whether the contaminant level exceeds the threshold level is 
analyzed with the hedonic model. This allows for determination of the full risk posed by 
the pollutants and the true effect of higher contaminant levels relative to the threshold. 
 One issue with specific contaminants relates to differences in public perceptions. 
For example, a given household may have an irrational fear of lead near their home due 
to media-influenced perceptions, while an unknown polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon 
could be more toxic. In my analysis it is difficult to measure whether housing transaction 
price is greatly affected by one contaminant over another due to public perception. 
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4.2 Housing Data 
The Dataquick data set was purchased by the Duke Economics Department and 
provides information about housing transactions surrounding brownfield areas. This 
includes historical transaction data on the house, as well as attribute data recorded from 
tax assessments. Thus, information such as zip code, county name; information on 
whether primary property owner is an individual; a company or a trust; the value of the 
property according to the tax assessor (used to compute amount of taxes to be paid); the 
square footage; if the home contains a fireplace, garage, carport, porch or a pool; the 
number of bedrooms and bathrooms in the home; the year in which primary structure on 
property was built; and the year in which any major renovations were made to the 
property are noted.  
Of these data, the most important for the regression analysis is the housing 
transaction price. Thus, any house that is missing its sale price is removed from the data 
set.  House prices are normalized using the All Urban Consumers Housing CPI based on 
January 2000 levels given by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. This 
adjustment allows for direct comparison between housing transaction prices, without 
inflationary or deflationary effects over time. 
The year in which renovations are made are also taken into consideration, as any 
major renovation made after the brownfield site assessment may drastically change the 
house characteristics and value, making data on previous sales inaccurate. Because of 
this, these houses are not included in the data set.  Houses with missing information for 
bathrooms, bedrooms or square footage are also removed. Concerns of self-selection bias 
surrounding houses with missing data are minimal as the information is reported by an 
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employee from the county assessors office and not the homebuyer or seller, which 
suggests that missing observations are typically random. Houses that are further than 3km 
from a brownfield site are also excluded in order to minimize issues associated with 
location-specific unobservable differences. 
One major issue with the Dataquick data is that the analysis looks at a period of 
time beginning January 2, 1998 and ending October 5, 2012. As brownfield 
contamination data begins in approximately 1989, the housing data is not as expansive. 
Therefore, the earlier EPA contamination data cannot be taken into consideration. The set 
of brownfields under consideration are therefore those that were examined between 1998 
and 2012, that have housing transaction data within 3km, that did not experience any 
form of clean up and that have detailed reports with specific dates and contaminant data, 
resulting in 66 unique brownfields in Massachusetts.  
 
4.3 Graphical Information System 
Districts are defined as areas where “public education services [are provided] for 
the area’s residents” (U.S. Census Bureau).  In Massachusetts, there are 224 defined 
districts, and information on crime, school quality and income for each district is 
reported. Of these 224 districts, 89 are examined after limiting houses to those within 
3km of sites. 
Specifically, to measure school quality, the percentage of students that obtain a 
score of proficient or advanced on the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System 
(MCAS) in each school district is measured. On this test, four scores are possible: 
advanced, proficient, needs improvement and warning/fail. This information, as well as 
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that on percentage of low income residents in each district and crime measures can all be 
found at the Mass.gov website. 
As the exact location of each house and each brownfield is known, the longitudes 
and latitudes from each site were used as inputs into graphical information system (GIS). 
Thus, the distance between each house and the nearest brownfield was calculated, 
dropping houses that lay outside of a 3km radius. In some cases, homes are found to be 
within radius of multiple brownfields, with some households being within 3km of 6 sites. 
To account for this additional pollution threat, homes that had more than one brownfield 
within the 3km radius were dropped from my analysis. Figure 1 illustrates a map of 
Massachusetts outlining the precise location of these brownfield sites within census tract 
lines. 
 
Figure 1: Massachusetts Brownfield Sites within Census Tracts 
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Similarly, GIS was utilized when determining the locations of aquifer sites. The 
brownfield map in Figure 1 was overlaid on a map denoting the locations of aquifers in 
Massachusetts. Figure 2 illustrates the map of Massachusetts outlining the location of 
aquifers in relation to brownfield sites within census tract lines. This new map was then 
used to determine the distance from each brownfield site to the nearest aquifer, which 
assisted in the creation of the dummy variable aquifer, set equal to one if the distance 
from the aquifer to the brownfield is equal to zero.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Massachusetts Aquifer Sites within Census Tracts 
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4.4 Other Data 
For the 66 brownfield sites analyzed, information exists outlining whether a site 
was eventually awarded a cleanup, the site proposal score, and the grant application type 
(petroleum, hazardous substances or both). These three factors were all set as controls in 
the analysis. The majority of brownfield sites (~80%) have contaminant data spanning 
across multiple years, with 292 unique chemicals found across all sites. Table 8 in the 
Appendix lists all chemicals found as well as their frequency. It is important to note that 
every site is not tested for every chemical. This is because some chemicals, such as 
pesticides, are only produced or used in certain industrial sites, and thus would not be 
present in all brownfield locations. Approximately 9,000 data points are recorded as the 
maximum concentrations of unique chemicals at all sites in all mediums.  
Initially, the 292 chemicals were classified into 20 groups, including post 
transition metals, transition metals, xylenes, ringed polyaromatic hydrocarbons and 
napthalenes. Table 7 in the appendix illustrates the chemical groups created, outlined by 
the threshold exceedance found for each group. This breakdown based on chemical 
structure resulted in co-linearity issues between multiple variables, potentially due to 
companies using certain chemicals in sites that are complementary, despite differing 
chemical composition. Thus, maximum toxicity values are taken without regard for the 
chemical structure of the contaminant.  
The final dataset defines one observation as one housing transaction. Housing 
characteristics are noted for each property, as well as transaction price, date of sale, and 
information pertaining to the local brownfield site, including maximum toxicity and 
whether a threshold is exceeded. For each house, distance to the nearest brownfield site is 
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also noted after utilization of GIS software if the site falls within the designated radius of 
3km.  
District fixed effects are also used to control for time-invariant factors that are 
unobservable within neighborhoods. Year fixed effects and district fixed effects absorb 
the across-group observable and unobservable predictors, allowing for an improved 
analysis of the within-group action. This also minimizes the likelihood of omitted 
variable biases arising from year or neighborhood differences.  
 
5 Results 
Table 2 below shows summary statistics by house, neighborhood and brownfield 
attributes. The mean housing transaction price from 1998 to 2012 in Massachusetts 
falling within 3km of a brownfield site was $221,647.30 with a standard deviation of 
$140,491.30 after price deflation by CPI. There are 290,770 values for housing 
transaction price.  Summary statistics show that the median maxtox value is 3.92, 
meaning 392% toxicity over threshold values, making this value economically 
significant. Further summary statistics of assessment results can be found in Table 9 in 
the Appendix.  
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
A. House Attributes 
Variable N mean p50 sd min max 
Price 290770 221647.30 189770.60 140491.30 21967.15 1166016.00 
# Bathrooms 290770 1.77 1.50 0.89 0.00 90.00 
# Bedrooms 290770 3.04 3.00 1.66 0.00 128.00 
Sq. ft. 290770 1690.85 1447.00 1149.68 0.00 32410.00 
Year Built 288215 1946.35 1953.00 42.32 1650.00 2012.00 
Condo 290770 0.29 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Single Family 290770 0.56 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Age 288215 57.17 51.00 42.36 0.00 350.00 
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       B. Neighborhood Attributes (By School District) 
Variable N mean p50 sd min max 
% Low income  89 24.26 17.00 21.46 0.80 87.10 
% Crime  88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
% Proficient or Advanced 89 47.46 46.00 23.44 9.00 88.00 
       C. Neighborhood Attributes (by Brownfield) 
Industrial activity nearby 58 0.45 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Residential nearby 58 0.78 1.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 
School nearby 58 0.59 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Green nearby 58 0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the basic hedonic regression. House, neighborhood, 
district and brownfield characteristics are controlled for in Column (1), with Column (2) 
introducing district-level fixed effects. These results show that there is a negative and 
significant coefficient on maxtox in Columns (1). Additionally, it is seen that exceeding a 
threshold for any chemical causes housing prices to increase by 7.39% after controlling 
for neighborhood attributes, and 6.36% after incorporating district level fixed effects. 
This counter-intuitive result may be due to unobservable factors correlated with 
exceedthreshold and price, illuminating the need of an IV approach. 
 
Table 3: Hedonic Price Regression 
Dependent Variable:  (1) (2) 
log (Price) OLS FE 
      
exceedthreshold 0.0739*** 0.0636*** 
 
(0.0029) (0.0031) 
maxtox -4.04e-10*** -2.16E-11 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
distance to Brownfield 5.87e-05*** 7.45e-05*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
# bathrooms  0.156*** 0.130*** 
 
(0.0017) (0.0015) 
# bedrooms  -0.0162*** -0.00799*** 
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(0.0009) (0.0008) 
sqft 0.000119*** 0.000119*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
year built -0.0509*** 0.0122*** 
 
(0.0012) (0.0013) 
age -0.0508*** 0.0112*** 
 
(0.0012) (0.0013) 
condo 0.112*** 0.143*** 
 
(0.0038) (0.0034) 
single family 0.0407*** -0.0928*** 
 
(0.0046) (0.0042) 
awarded -0.0802*** -0.0375*** 
 
(0.0052) (0.0067) 
proposal score 0.00725*** 0.00552*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0002) 
hazardous substances 0.0950*** -0.118*** 
 
(0.0074) (0.0200) 
petroleum -0.126*** -0.118*** 
 
(0.0065) (0.0174) 
property size (acres) -0.00293*** 0.0175*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0007) 
% Low income  0.00497*** 0.000434 
 
(0.0001) (0.0003) 
% Crime  -7.912*** 0.0995 
 
(0.4067) (0.6570) 
% Proficient or Advanced 0.0142*** -0.00254*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0002) 
Industrial activity nearby -0.351*** -0.0928*** 
 
(0.0030) (0.0059) 
Residential nearby -0.0602*** -0.177*** 
 
(0.0030) (0.0045) 
School nearby 0.0984*** 0.0723*** 
 
(0.0026) (0.0040) 
Green nearby 0.0761*** 0.0691*** 
 
(0.0031) (0.0043) 
Constant 111.9*** -13.30*** 
 
(2.3697) (2.5579) 
   Observations 150,430 150,430 
R-squared 0.506 0.358 
House Characteristics X X 
Year Fixed Effects X X 
Neighborhood Characteristics X X 
District Fixed Effects 
 
X 
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When examining house and district attributes by threshold exceedance in Table 4, 
significant differences are observed between houses sold near brownfield sites that 
exceed thresholds and those that do not. In the lower sections of the table, attributes are 
demeaned by district in order to incorporate fixed effects. This table illustrates that most 
differences in housing characteristics are rejected, however those that fail to be rejected 
do not present a major concern as they can be controlled for within the data. Overall, 
neighborhood attribute differences present more of an issue as they are more likely to 
bias the exceedthreshold variable.  
 
Table 4: Attributes by Type 
A. House Attributes 
 
exceedthreshold = 1 exceedthreshold = 0 
      Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs.   tstat pval Reject? 
           Price 215403.15 123752.52 125710 195149.77 108658.53 29244 
 
-25.77 0.00 Y 
# Bathrooms 1.78 0.90 125710 1.77 0.91 29244 
 
-1.61 0.11 N 
# Bedrooms 3.10 1.69 125710 3.05 1.61 29244 
 
-4.53 0.00 Y 
Sq. ft. 1703.18 1175.03 125710 1696.55 1067.49 29244 
 
-0.88 0.38 N 
Condo 0.23 0.42 125710 0.21 0.41 29244 
 
-5.99 0.00 Y 
Single Family 0.61 0.49 125710 0.66 0.47 29244 
 
13.77 0.00 Y 
Age 56.30 41.03 124636 51.84 43.17 28815 
 
-16.45 0.00 Y 
           
 
exceedthreshold = 1 exceedthreshold = 0 
    Demean by 
District Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs.   tstat pval Reject? 
           Price 11812.42 100756.67 125710 7034.18 89251.27 29244 
 
-7.46 0.00 Y 
# Bathrooms 0.00 0.88 125710 0.01 0.89 29244 
 
2.06 0.04 Y 
# Bedrooms -0.01 1.64 125710 -0.05 1.59 29244 
 
-4.02 0.00 Y 
Sq. ft. -3.28 1152.21 125710 -20.82 1050.88 29244 
 
-2.38 0.02 Y 
Condo 0.01 0.38 125710 0.02 0.39 29244 
 
5.01 0.00 Y 
Single Family -0.01 0.44 125710 -0.02 0.45 29244 
 
-4.96 0.00 Y 
Age 1.12 38.14 124636 -0.10 40.82 28815 
 
-4.80 0.00 Y 
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B. Neighborhood Attributes 
 
exceedthreshold = 1 exceedthreshold = 0 
      Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs.   tstat pval Reject? 
           % Low income  28.74 23.17 614 25.12 22.44 136 
 
-1.66 0.10 Y 
% Crime  4.82E-03 4.32E-03 606 3.86E-03 3.94E-03 134 
 
-2.38 0.02 Y 
% Proficient or 
Advanced 59.97 19.48 614 60.85 21.48 136 
 
0.47 0.64 N 
           
 
exceedthreshold = 1 exceedthreshold = 0 
    Demean by 
District Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs.   tstat pval Reject? 
           % Low income  1.34 5.12 614 1.23 3.75 136 
 
-0.25 0.80 N 
% Crime  -2.38E-04 1.80E-03 606 1.13E-04 1.37E-03 134 
 
2.13 0.03 Y 
% Proficient or 
Advanced 7.76 13.78 614 7.30 13.12 136   -0.35 0.73 N 
 
The data shows that within districts, the means of percentage of low income and 
crime are higher for areas where thresholds were not exceeded. In general, neighborhoods 
that have better amenities will generally be associated with lower threshold levels, as by 
Massachusetts state definition thresholds are lower when close to a hospital, school or 
ground water source. This provides a possible explanation for the positive coefficient on 
exceedthreshold. To deal with this endogeneity issue, an instrumental variable approach 
is used, as detailed earlier in the paper, with aquifer being used as an instrument for 
exceedthreshold.  
Although the relevance condition for aquifer should be satisfied, as threshold 
levels are dependent on distance from an aquifer by MA regulation, this can be verified in 
the first stage of the IV regression.  The second condition for use of an instrument is the 
exogeneity condition, and as noted before is typically harder to justify.  Table 5 shows 
house and district attributes for brownfields if located within 500m of an aquifer.  I find 
that number of bathrooms, percentage of condo and single-family homes are all 
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significantly different for houses located near an aquifer when compared to those that are 
not. This is reasonable due to the fact that aquifers are more likely to be located in rural 
areas, where space constraints are less important, minimizing the presence of 
condominiums. An overall summary of attribute differences can be found in Table 10 in 
the Appendix.  
Table 5: Attributes by Threshold Exceedance 
A. House Attributes 
 
aquifer = 1 aquifer = 0 
      Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs.   tstat pval Reject? 
           Price -356.27 86512.52 57387 308.65 84432.14 66241 
 
1.37 0.17 N 
# Bathrooms -0.01 0.82 57387 0.01 0.99 66241 
 
3.06 0.00 Y 
# Bedrooms 0.00 1.62 57387 0.00 1.66 66241 
 
0.85 0.39 N 
Sq. ft. -2.74 1161.28 57387 2.37 1179.38 66241 
 
0.76 0.44 N 
Condo 0.01 0.36 57387 -0.01 0.38 66241 
 
-
5.85 0.00 Y 
Single Family 0.00 0.43 57387 0.00 0.45 66241 
 
3.21 0.00 Y 
Age 0.05 40.43 56997 -0.04 38.59 65460 
 
-
0.38 0.70 N 
           B. Neighborhood Attributes 
 
aquifer = 1 aquifer = 0 
      Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs.   tstat pval Reject? 
           % Low income  -0.03 4.11 258 0.08 4.48 285 
 
-0.13 0.89 N 
% Crime  3.10E-05 2.05E-03 254 -4.40E-05 2.12E-03 278 
 
0.43 0.67 N 
% Proficient or 
Advanced -0.10 17.13 258 0.11 18.72 285   -0.23 0.82 N 
Note: Variables are first demeaned by district. 
 
The results using aquifer as an instrument for thresholds are presented in Column 
(1) of Table 6, with the IV estimates in Column (2). It is shown that being located on an 
aquifer increases the chances of exceeding a threshold, satisfying the relevance condition. 
The IV estimate shows that exceeding a threshold leads to a 10.8% decline in housing 
price. Furthermore, while threshold exceedance is significant, the maximum toxicity 
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value is insignificant at the 1% level, suggesting that once a threshold is exceeded, 
individuals are less concerned with increasing toxicities.  
 
Table 6: Hedonic Price Regression using Instrumental Variables 
 
(1) (2) 
 
First Stage IV 
   Dependent Variable:  exceedthreshold log(Price) 
      
exceedthreshold 
 
-0.108** 
  
(0.0426) 
aquifer 0.849*** 
 
 
(0.0437) 
 maxtox -1.04e-10* -3.79E-12 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
distance to Brownfield 2.40e-06 5.19e-05*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
# bathrooms  -0.00349 0.0896*** 
 
(0.0023) (0.0142) 
# bedrooms  -5.11e-05 -0.00167 
 
(0.0009) (0.0078) 
sqft 2.25e-07 0.000117*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
year built -0.0150 0.00617 
 
(0.0181) (0.0085) 
age -0.0151 0.00419 
 
(0.0181) (0.0086) 
condo -0.00190 0.128*** 
 
(0.0057) (0.0362) 
single family -0.00849 -0.228*** 
 
(0.0098) (0.0661) 
awarded 0.566*** 0.0398 
 
(0.0683) (0.0310) 
proposal score -0.00204 0.00484*** 
 
(0.0024) (0.0015) 
hazardous substances 0.167** 0.00905 
 
(0.0761) (0.0440) 
petroleum 0.0165 -0.0551** 
 
(0.0254) (0.0257) 
property size (acres) 0.0353*** 0.00564 
 
(0.0118) (0.0052) 
% Low income  -0.00315 -0.00242 
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(0.0062) (0.0017) 
% Crime  -11.10 -6.119 
 
(10.9047) (4.5145) 
% Proficient or 
Advanced 0.00361 0.000401 
 
(0.0038) (0.0012) 
Industrial activity nearby 0.541*** -0.0536 
 
(0.0878) (0.0993) 
Residential nearby -0.309*** 0.0126 
 
(0.0482) (0.0237) 
School nearby -0.401*** 0.0508* 
 
(0.0330) (0.0251) 
Green nearby -0.391*** 0.0173 
 
(0.0357) (0.0263) 
Constant 27.21 -8.892 
 
(27.6907) (22.6718) 
   
 
64,784 64,784 
R-squared 0.416 0.606 
House Characteristics X X 
Year Fixed Effects X X 
Neighborhood 
Characteristics X X 
District Fixed Effects X X 
   
   
 
7 Conclusions 
 This paper examines the importance of conveying information to homeowners 
regarding severity of pollution. This is achieved by measuring housing price differentials 
based upon exceeding chemical threshold levels while conditioning on actual toxicity. A 
special feature of the way in which threshold levels are set was exploited to see 
exogenous variation in threshold exceedance while holding toxicity fixed. As thresholds 
are a binary measure and the amount over the threshold is calculable, this allows for 
comparison between a binary or discrete measure for information transfer. The 
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endogeneity of thresholds necessitates the utilization of aquifer distance as an instrument 
to induce variation in the likelihood of exceeding a threshold.    
 In the fixed effects regression where the instrument was not used, exceeding a 
threshold, which can be interpreted as a more dangerous toxicity level, counter intuitively 
leads to an increase in housing values of 5% after controlling for house, time-varying 
neighborhood and brownfield attributes. This regression also shows that the toxicity 
level, as defined by the maximum concentration of an individual contaminant divided by 
the relevant threshold, has a negative but insignificant effect on housing prices. The 
positive threshold exceedance variable suggests that the estimator does not adequately 
control for differences in local amenities that are correlated with whether a threshold is 
exceeded. To verify the validity of the instrument, I examine the differences in attribute 
means conditional on aquifer distance. The regression results using instrumentation 
demonstrated a 10.8% decrease in housing transaction price if a contaminant threshold is 
exceeded. The estimator on maximum toxicity found at the site remains negative and 
insignificant.  
 The findings in this paper suggest that individuals respond better to information 
presented in a binary fashion, potentially due to ease of interpretation. I also find that 
thresholds used for binary categorization are negatively capitalized into housing prices, 
while the continuous toxicity measure is found to be statistically insignificant. Given this 
result, in order to develop an informed public about local pollution concerns, policy 
makers should carefully consider the format of information presented and its ease of 
interpretation.  
 
	   34	  
APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Chemical Group by Threshold Exceedance 
Chemical Group by Threshold Exceedance 
 
exceedthreshold 
  Chemical Group 0 1 Total 
    Post Transition Metals 155 100 255 
Transition Metals 707 179 886 
Alkaline Earth & Alkali Metals 384 102 486 
Other Elements & Asbestos 287 60 347 
Aliphatics 444 154 598 
Other Aromatics 947 222 1,169 
Xylenes 225 29 254 
3 ring PAH 661 65 726 
4 ring PAH 326 119 445 
5+ ring PAH 563 275 838 
PCB & Oil 130 32 162 
Hydrocarbons & Other organics 194 13 207 
Organochlorides 580 185 765 
Aromatic Organochlorides 185 21 206 
Organobromides 95 4 99 
Napthalenes 295 39 334 
Pesticides 101 14 115 
Ketone 97 11 108 
Aromatics with multiple substituent 
groups 125 19 144 
Nitro containing compounds 88 8 96 
Total 6,589 1,651 8,240 
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Table 8: List of Site Chemicals and Frequency 
                  
Chemical Freq % Chemical Freq % Chemical Freq % 
1,1,1,2  Tetrachloroethane 11 0.13 Aroclor 1221 13 0.16 Fluoranthene 152 1.84 
1,1,1  Tetrachloroethane 1 0.01 Aroclor 1232 13 0.16 Fluorene 147 1.78 
1,1,1  Trichloroethane 52 0.63 Aroclor 1242 15 0.18 Freon  11 2 0.02 
1,1,2,2  Tetrachloroethane 14 0.17 Aroclor 1248 19 0.23 Freon  113 3 0.04 
1,1,2  Trichloroethane 15 0.18 Aroclor 1250 2 0.02 Freon  114 1 0.01 
1,1,2  Trichlorotrifluoroethane 2 0.02 Aroclor 1254 28 0.34 Freon  12 2 0.02 
1,1  Biphenyl 1 0.01 Aroclor 1260 32 0.39 Heptachlor 7 0.08 
1,1  Dichloroethane 45 0.55 Aroclor 1262 9 0.11 Heptachlor Epoxide 3 0.04 
1,1  Dichloroethene 24 0.29 Aroclor 1268 8 0.1 Heptane 1 0.01 
1,1  Dichloroethylene 7 0.08 Arsenic 158 1.92 Hexachlorobenzene 7 0.08 
1,1  Dichloropropene 7 0.08 Asbestos 3 0.04 Hexachlorobutadiene 15 0.18 
1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9  OCDD 2 0.02 Azobenzene 3 0.04 Hexachlorocyclopentadiene 1 0.01 
1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9  OCDF 2 0.02 Barium 138 1.67 Hexachloroethane 4 0.05 
1,2,3,4,6,7,8  HpCDD 4 0.05 Benzene 130 1.58 Indeno (1,2,3  cd) pyrene 140 1.7 
1,2,3,4,7,8,9  HpCDF 2 0.02 Benzo (a) anthracene 145 1.76 Iodomethane 1 0.01 
1,2,3,4,7,8  HxCDD 2 0.02 Benzo (a) pyrene 145 1.76 Iron 18 0.22 
1,2,3,4,7,8  HxCDF 2 0.02 Benzo (a,e) pyrene 1 0.01 Isophorone 8 0.1 
1,2,3,6,7,8  HxCDD 2 0.02 Benzo (b) fluoranthene 146 1.77 Isopropanol 1 0.01 
1,2,3,6,7,8  HxCDF 2 0.02 Benzo (e) pyrene 7 0.08 Isopropyl Ether 1 0.01 
1,2,3,7,8,9  HxCDD 2 0.02 Benzo (g,h,i) perylene 130 1.58 Lead 178 2.16 
1,2,3,7,8,9  HxCDF 1 0.01 Benzo (j,k) Fluoranthene 1 0.01 Magnesium 13 0.16 
1,2,3,7,8  PeCDD 2 0.02 Benzo (k) fluoranthene 141 1.71 Manganese 19 0.23 
1,2,3,7,8  PeCDF 2 0.02 Benzoic Acid 1 0.01 Mercury 125 1.52 
1,2,3  Trichlorobenzene 16 0.19 Benzyl chloride 1 0.01 Methoxychlor 5 0.06 
1,2,3  Trichloropropane 8 0.1 Beryllium 80 0.97 Methyl Ethyl Ketone 2 0.02 
1,2,3  Trimethylbenzene 1 0.01 Bis (2  Chloroethoxy) Methane 4 0.05 Methyl Isobutyl Ketone 6 0.07 
1,2,4  Trichlorobenzene 24 0.29 Bis (2  Chloroethy) Ether 5 0.06 Methyl tert butyl ether 131 1.59 
1,2,4  Trimethylbenzene 75 0.91 Bis (2  Ethyhexyl) phthalate 15 0.18 Methylene Chloride 33 0.4 
1,2  Dibromo  3  Chloropropane 8 0.1 Bis (2  Ethylhexyl) phthalate 2 0.02 Motor Oil 1 0.01 
1,2  Dibromoethane 12 0.15 Bromobenzene 10 0.12 N  Nitrosodiphenylamine 2 0.02 
1,2  Dichlorobenzene 32 0.39 Bromochloromethane 10 0.12 Naphthalene 210 2.55 
1,2  Dichloroethane 21 0.25 Bromodichloromethane 13 0.16 Nickel 102 1.24 
1,2  Dichloropropane 15 0.18 Bromoform 14 0.17 Nitrate 1 0.01 
1,2  Diphenylhydrazine 1 0.01 Bromomethane 16 0.19 Nitrite 1 0.01 
1,2  dichloropropane 1 0.01 Butylbenzylphtalate 7 0.08 Nitrobenzene 4 0.05 
1,3,5  Trimethylbenzene 69 0.84 
C10  C28 Medium Petroleum 
Distillate 1 0.01 Pentachlorophenol 12 0.15 
1,3  Butadiene 3 0.04 C11  C22 Aromatics 179 2.17 Perchloroethylene 1 0.01 
1,3  Dichlorobenzene 26 0.32 C13  C16 Aliphatics 1 0.01 Perylene 5 0.06 
1,3  Dichloropropane 7 0.08 C16  C36 Heavy Petroleum Distillate 1 0.01 Pesticides 3 0.04 
1,4  Dichlorobenzene 38 0.46 C19  C22 Aromatics 1 0.01 Phenanthrene 161 1.95 
1,4  Dioxane 8 0.1 C19  C36 Aliphatics 174 2.11 Phenol 7 0.08 
	   36	  
1  Methylnaphthalene 12 0.15 C5  C10 Aromatics 2 0.02 Phosphorus 1 0.01 
2,2  Dichloropropane 7 0.08 C5  C8 Aliphatics 127 1.54 Potassium 9 0.11 
2,2  Oxybis (1  Chloropropane) 3 0.04 C6  C12 Light Petroleum Distillate 1 0.01 Propylene 1 0.01 
2,3,4,6,7,8  HxCDF 2 0.02 C6  C36 Aromatics 2 0.02 Pyrene 154 1.87 
2,3,4,7,8  PeCDF 2 0.02 C6  C8 Aliphatics 2 0.02 Pyridine 2 0.02 
2,3,7,8  TCDD 2 0.02 C9  C10 Aromatics 128 1.55 Selenium 105 1.27 
2,3,7,8  TCDD TEQ 1 0.01 C9  C12 Aliphatics 128 1.55 Silver 117 1.42 
2,3,7,8  TCDF 2 0.02 C9  C18 Aliphatics 165 2 Sodium 9 0.11 
2,4,5  Trichlorophenol 6 0.07 C9  C36 Aliphatics 1 0.01 Styrene 17 0.21 
2,4,6  Trichlorophenol 5 0.06 Cadmium 135 1.64 Sulfate 1 0.01 
2,4  Dichlorophenol 4 0.05 Calcium 9 0.11 Tetrachlorethene 64 0.78 
2,4  Dimethylphenol 6 0.07 Carbazole 10 0.12 Tetrachloroethylene 18 0.22 
2,4  Dinitrophenol 4 0.05 Carbon Disulfide 14 0.17 Tetrahydrofuran 8 0.1 
2,4  Dinitrotoluene 4 0.05 Carbon Tetrachloride 13 0.16 Thallium 68 0.83 
2,6  Dimethylnaphthalene 3 0.04 Chlordane 2 0.02 Toluene 147 1.78 
2,6  Dinitrotoluene 4 0.05 Chlorobenzene 29 0.35 Trichloro  fluoro  methane 2 0.02 
2  Butanone 26 0.32 Chlorodibromomethane 3 0.04 Trichloroethene 62 0.75 
2  Chloronaphthalene 8 0.1 Chloroethane 20 0.24 Trichloroethylene 20 0.24 
2  Chlorophenol 4 0.05 Chloroform 21 0.25 Trichlorofluoromethane 9 0.11 
2  Chlorotoluene 9 0.11 Chloromethane 15 0.18 Vanadium 69 0.84 
2  Hexanone 12 0.15 Chromium 151 1.83 Vinyl Acetate 5 0.06 
2  Methylnaphthalene 159 1.93 Chrysene 146 1.77 Vinyl Chloride 42 0.51 
2  Methylphenol 5 0.06 Cobalt 8 0.1 Xylene 92 1.12 
2  Nitroaniline 2 0.02 Copper 50 0.61 Zinc 109 1.32 
2  Nitrophenol 4 0.05 Cyanide 29 0.35 alpha  BHC 4 0.05 
3,3  Dichlorobenzidine 4 0.05 Cyclohexane 1 0.01 alpha  Chlordane 4 0.05 
3  Nitroaniline 2 0.02 Di n  Butylphthalate 13 0.16 beta  BHC 5 0.06 
4,4'  DDD 9 0.11 Di n  Octylphthalate 6 0.07 
bis (2  Chloroisopropyl) 
Ether 1 0.01 
4,4'  DDE 9 0.11 Dibenzo (a,h) anthracene 127 1.54 cis 1,2  Dichloroethene 45 0.55 
4,4'  DDT 11 0.13 Dibenzofuran 18 0.22 cis  1,2  Dichloroethylene 10 0.12 
4,6  Dinitro  2  Methylphenol 2 0.02 Dibenzothiophene 2 0.02 cis  1,3  Dichloropropene 13 0.16 
4   Isopropyltoluene 1 0.01 Dibromochloromethane 10 0.12 cis  Dichloroethene 8 0.1 
4  Bromophenyl  phenylether 4 0.05 Dibromoethane 1 0.01 delta  BHC 2 0.02 
4  Chloro  3  Methylphenol 2 0.02 Dibromomethane 6 0.07 gamma  BHC 3 0.04 
4  Chloroaniline 4 0.05 Dichlorodifluoromethane 12 0.15 gamma  Chlordane 6 0.07 
4  Chlorophenyl Phenyl Ether 2 0.02 Dichloromethane 1 0.01 isopropylbenzene 54 0.66 
4  Chlorotoluene 11 0.13 Dieldrin 11 0.13 m/p Cresol 1 0.01 
4  Ethyltoluene 1 0.01 Diethyl Ether 4 0.05 m/p Xylene 86 1.04 
4  Isopropylbenzene 1 0.01 Diethylphthalate 6 0.07 n  Butylbenzene 49 0.59 
4  Isopropyltoluene 23 0.28 Diisopropyl Ether 6 0.07 n  Hexane 1 0.01 
4  Methyl  2  Pentanone 9 0.11 Dimethylphthalate 4 0.05 n  Nitroso di n  Propylamine 2 0.02 
4  Methylphenol 5 0.06 Dioxins 5 0.06 n  Propylbenzene 59 0.72 
4  Nitroaniline 2 0.02 Endosulfan 1 0.01 o  Chlorotoluene 1 0.01 
4  Nitrophenol 3 0.04 Endosulfan I 3 0.04 o  Cresol 1 0.01 
4  nitrophenol 1 0.01 Endosulfan II 3 0.04 o  Xylene 76 0.92 
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Acenaphthene 140 1.7 Endosulfan Sulfate 1 0.01 p  Chlorotoluene 1 0.01 
Acenaphthylene 132 1.6 Endosulfan sulfate 1 0.01 p  Isopropyltoluene 27 0.33 
Acetone 40 0.49 Endrin 3 0.04 sec  Butylbenzene 51 0.62 
Acetophenone 5 0.06 Endrin Aldehyde 1 0.01 tert  Amyl Methyl Ether 7 0.08 
Aldrin 3 0.04 Endrin Ketone 4 0.05 tert  Butylalcohol 1 0.01 
Aluminum 9 0.11 Ethanol 1 0.01 tert  Butylbenzene 19 0.23 
Aniline 5 0.06 Ether 2 0.02 tert  Butylethyl Ether 3 0.04 
Anthracene 146 1.77 Ethyl Acetate 1 0.01 trans  1,2  Dichloroethene 21 0.25 
Antimony 81 0.98 Ethyl Ether 1 0.01 trans  1,2  Dichloroethylene 9 0.11 
Aroclor 5 0.06 Ethyl tert butyl Ether 3 0.04 trans  1,3  Dichloropropane 1 0.01 
Aroclor 1016 13 0.16 Ethylbenzene 150 1.82 trans  1,3  Dichloropropene 12 0.15 
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Table 9: Brownfield & Assessment Summary Statistics 
       Brownfield Attributes 
Variable N mean p50 sd min max 
Awarded 58 0.79 1.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Proposal Score 56 94.13 96.00 14.14 53.00 118.00 
Hazardous Substance 58 0.83 1.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Petroleum 58 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.00 
property size (acres) 54 4.49 1.55 6.29 0.02 27.00 
       Assessment Results 
Variable Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max 
       Samples Taken 262 31.45 28.00 25.79 1.00 162.00 
maxconcentration 262 4461.94 3.92 32329.32 0.00 460000 
Threshold Value 262 12947.91 300.00 80511.96 0.01 1000000 
Soil 262 0.56 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Groundwater 262 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Other (air, surface water, sediment) 262 0.05 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.00 
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Table 10: Summary of Attribute Differences 
 
By Exceed Threshold By Aquifer 
   
Demean Demean 
Characteristics t-stat Reject? t-stat Reject? t-stat Reject? 
Price -25.77 Y -7.46 Y 1.37 N 
# Bathrooms -1.61 N 2.06 Y 3.06 Y 
# Bedrooms -4.53 Y -4.02 Y 0.85 N 
Sq. ft. -0.88 N -2.38 Y 0.76 N 
Condo -5.99 Y 5.01 Y -5.85 Y 
Single Family 13.77 Y -4.96 Y 3.21 Y 
Age -16.45 Y -4.80 Y -0.38 N 
PWS 
    
0.03 N 
       % Low income  -1.66 Y -0.25 N -0.13 N 
% Crime  -2.38 Y 2.13 Y 0.43 N 
% Proficient or Advanced 0.47 Y -0.35 N -0.23 N 
 
Note: Rejection of the Null that differences in means across groups are equal are 
denoted in Bold. 
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